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SPOOFING: INEFFECTIVE REGULATION INCREASES
MARKET INEFFICIENCY
INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to define how efficient financial markets operate,
world-renowned economist Milton Friedman famously said, “[t]he
most important single central fact about a free market is that no ex-
change takes place unless both parties benefit.”1  This theory no
longer applies to the derivatives markets as increased manipulation
has led to transactions whereby only one party benefits and inefficien-
cies abound.2
Trading derivatives has occurred in the United States since the mid-
1800s.3  Recently the futures market has played host to an increasingly
complex regulatory scheme.  The changing rules and regulations pro-
vide traders and officials with the opportunity to issue guidance to
achieve enforcement goals.4  The financial products in this market
cover everything from wheat, soybeans, oil, natural gas, and gold.5
Thus, the futures market plays an increasingly large role in the eco-
nomic wellbeing of the United States.  The diversified United States
futures market has expanded trading opportunities and is currently
valued at $30 trillion.6  The substantial size of the market has incen-
1. Interview with Milton Friedman, PBS: COMMANDING HEIGHTS (Oct. 1, 2000), https://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/int_miltonfriedman.html (last visited
Nov. 7, 2016).
2. George S. Canellos et al., The Law Surrounding Spoofing in the Derivatives and Securities
Markets, MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP (2016), https://www.milbank.com/images/
content/2/2/22241/Spoofing-in-the-Derivatives-and-Securitites-Markets-Nov-2015.pdf.
3. International Business Times, Commodity Trading – Chapter 1: History of Commodity
Trading, NASDAQ (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/commodity-trading-chapter-1-
history-of-commodity-trading-cm118267.  “A derivative is a contract between two or more par-
ties whose value is based on an agreed-upon underlying financial asset, index, or security.”  Jean
Folger, What is a Derivative?, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/
answers/12/derivative.asp.  Futures contracts are a common type of derivative, and the two terms
are used interchangeably throughout this Comment. Id.
4. See generally Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Commodity and Security Ex-
changes, 17 C.F.R § 1 (2017).
5. Brian Perry, Beginner’s Guide to Trading Futures: The Basic Structure of the Futures Mar-
ket, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/university/beginners-guide-to-trading-futures/
basic-structure-futures-market.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
6. Matthew Leising, U.S. Questions Whether Futures Markets Can Police Themselves, STAN-
DARD-EXAMINER, June 28, 2016, http://www.standard.net/Business/2016/06/28/U-S-questions-
whether-futures-markets-can-police-themselves.
77
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tivized informed traders to utilize futures contracts to hedge trades
held in other financial markets or to simply make a profit.7
The increase in traders on the futures market and the implementa-
tion of high frequency trading programs has allowed sophisticated in-
vestors to take advantage of the unique nature of the futures market.8
Specifically, traders have been utilizing a market manipulation
method known as “spoofing,” whereby a high frequency trader using
algorithmic trading software (ATS) can fool the market into thinking
prices are rising or falling.9  The trader can repeatedly capture small
profits as a result of these manipulated changes that can add up to a
large gain.10  While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act) made this practice ille-
gal,11 traders continue to implement this method because enforcement
has proven difficult.  Spoofing has the potential to drastically alter the
futures market to the detriment of unwitting participants.  However,
the statute as written and guidance from the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) has not defined exactly what actions
constitute spoofing.12  The anti-spoofing statute contained within the
the Dodd-Frank Act is not an effective tool for monitoring and prose-
cuting high frequency traders in the derivatives markets.13 This Com-
ment argues spoofing can be mitigated by decentralizing the
7. A hedge is an investment to reduce risk of adverse price movements in an asset.  Normally,
a hedge consists of taking an offsetting position in a security, such as by utilizing a futures con-
tract.  If the price of the security falls, the futures contract limits the loss by partially offsetting
the loss. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC GLOSSARY, http://www.cftc.gov/
ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm#A (last visited Jan. 20, 2017)
[hereinafter CFTC GLOSSARY].
8. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, Request for Comments: Concept Release on Equity Market
Structure, 45 (Jan. 14, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-61358.pdf [hereinafter
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure].  In the securities market, a trader can purchase a
security from a brokerage, bank, or directly from the issuing company.  In the derivatives mar-
ket, however, a trader who wishes to purchase or sell derivative contracts with another trader,
either via an exchange or directly.  Kristina Zucchi, Derivatives 101, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/articles/optioninvestor/10/derivatives-101.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).
9. Larry Schneider, “Spoofing” and Disruptive Futures Trading Practices, N.Y. INST. OF FIN.,
https://www.nyif.com/articles/disruptive-futures-trading-practices-spoofing (last visited Feb. 2,
2017).
10. John Montgomery, Spoofing, Market Manipulation, and the Limit-Order Book, NAVIGANT
(May 3, 2016), https://www.navigant.com/-/media/www/site/insights/economics/2016/econ_spoof
ingmarketmanipulation_tl_0516.pdf.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
12. Andrew Verstein, Legal Confusion as to Spoofing, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (May
12, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-verstein/legal-confusion-as-to-
spo_b_7268518.html.
13. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
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regulatory scheme and granting partial enforcement power to the fu-
tures market exchanges.
Part II of this Comment discusses the background of the United
States derivatives markets, the relevant regulatory agencies, the im-
plementation of high frequency trading, the impact of the Dodd-Frank
Act, and recent spoofing litigation.  Part III analyzes how the current
anti-spoofing statute is ill-equipped to deal with modern high fre-
quency traders.  Part III also discusses the relative failure of the
Dodd-Frank Act to curb manipulation in the derivatives markets.
Next, this Comment argues that current anti-spoofing statutes can
lead to market inefficiencies in high frequency trading-dominated
markets by forcing traders to make compliant, economically unsound
trades, lest they risk enforcement actions by the CFTC.  It then pro-
poses a new regulatory scheme that modifies and transfers existing
enforcement powers allowing for high frequency trader compliance,
while still encouraging the highest level of market participation and
efficiency.  More specifically, Part III proposes a decentralization of
the current regulatory scheme by giving the exchanges that handle de-
rivatives trading increased authority to detect and prosecute spoofing.
Finally, Part IV examines the impact of the proposed decentralization
by examining how it will increase market efficiency and how the new
regulatory scheme will benefit the CFTC by making enforcement
more straightforward.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part begins with the history and evolution of the derivatives
markets in the United States.  It discusses the creation and expansion
of the CFTC.  This Part then explains the proliferation of high fre-
quency trading in the applicable markets and discusses how high fre-
quency traders use algorithmic trading software to manipulate the
markets, namely through a technique called spoofing.  Next, this Part
discusses the passage and implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act,
which increased the enforcement mechanisms available to the CFTC
to prosecute alleged spoofing violations.  Finally, this Part discusses
post Dodd-Frank spoofing litigation including United States v. Coscia,
CFTC v. Oystacher, and CFTC v. Sarao.
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A. The United States Derivatives Markets and the CFTC
Prior to established market exchanges, commodities such as corn
and wheat were informally exchanged between farmers and dealers.14
As a result of the inefficiencies of this rudimentary system the Board
of Trade of the City of Chicago (CBOT) was established in 1848 to
provide a formal and effective exchange whereby farmers and dealers
could contract for the future sale of agricultural products.15  While
early regulation was scarce, by the 1930s it was clear that divergent
regulatory schemes required consolidation under discrete legislation.
Enacted in 1936 the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) extended fed-
eral regulation to a list of enumerated commodities including, inter
alia, “cotton, rice, mill feeds, butter, eggs, and Irish potatoes, as well
as grains.”16  The CEA was administered and enforced by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USADA).17  In 1968 Congress amended
the CEA bringing livestock and related products under the jurisdic-
tion of the USADA.18
In 1974 Congress passed the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion Act (CFTC Act) to bring increased oversight to the ever-ex-
panding commodities market.19  The CFTC Act gave exclusive
jurisdiction to the newly formed CFTC, an independent federal regu-
lator with greater powers than its predecessor at the USADA.20  The
CFTC was given the power to approve new futures contracts and
quickly respond to changes in the futures market.21  The CFTC Act
also gave the CFTC the authority to enter contract markets and halt
trading when it believed contract prices were unstable, such as during
times of market manipulation.22  Through the remainder of the twen-
tieth century the CFTC gained regulatory authority over a greater,
more diverse set of futures contracts, including government bonds, op-
tions, and swaps.23
14. Joseph Santos, A History of Futures Trading in the United States, ECON. HIST. ASS’N (Mar.
16, 2008), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/a-history-of-futures-trading-in-the-united-states/.
15. Id.; U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, History of the CFTC: U.S. Futures
Trading and Regulation Before the Creation of the CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/About/Historyof
theCFTC/index.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2016) [hereinafter History of the CFTC].
16. History of the CFTC, supra note 15.
17. Id.
18. Id.; Commodity Exchange Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26 § 1 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2012)).
19. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
463, 88 Stat. 1389 § 201 [hereinafter CFTC Act].
20. History of the CFTC, supra note 15.
21. 7 U.S.C. § 1; CFTC Act, supra note 19, § 210.
22. 7 U.S.C. § 1; CFTC Act, supra note 19, § 215.
23. History of the CFTC, supra note 15.
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B. High Frequency Trading and Market Manipulation
High frequency trading is a type of transaction that utilizes
supercomputers able to execute orders within “microseconds or milli-
seconds.”24  While the term “high frequency trading” is often used as
a catchall with no precise definition, a detailed description is found in
a 2010 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concept release
on market structure.25  The release states high frequency trading is
“[o]ne of the most significant market structure developments in recent
years.”26  According to the SEC, “the term is relatively new and is not
yet clearly defined.”27  The term is often used when “professional
traders act[ ] in a proprietary capacity” (i.e., trading personal or firm
funds and not those of a client), and engage in computerized trading
strategies that “generate a large number of trades on a daily basis.”28
Other defining characteristics of proprietary firms using high fre-
quency trading include:
(1) the use of extraordinarily high-speed and sophisticated com-
puter programs for generating, routing, and executing orders; (2)
use of colocation services and individual data feeds offered by ex-
changes and others to minimize network and other types of laten-
cies; (3) very short time-frames for establishing and liquidating
positions in the market; (4) the submission of numerous orders to
an exchange that are cancelled shortly after submission; and (5)
ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible (that
is, not carrying significant, unhedged positions over night).29
Though high frequency trading strategies began with the introduc-
tion of supercomputers in the 1970s and 1980s, the platform drastically
expanded in the 1990s with the introduction of Electronic Communi-
cations Networks (ECNs).30  The ECN systems allowed traders to
place orders outside of common exchanges such as NASDAQ, NYSE,
CBOT, and CME, where trades had to be placed manually.31  Traders
quickly saw the benefits of ECNs and increasingly invested in the plat-
form because of the “greater speed and efficiency, lower costs, and
24. RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44443, HIGH FRE-
QUENCY TRADING: OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R44443.pdf.
25. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 8, at 45.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Anuj Agarwal, High Frequency Trading: Evolution and the Future, CAPGEMINI, Feb. 29,
2012, at 4, https://www.capgemini.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/High_Frequency_Trading__
Evolution_and_the_Future.pdf.
31. Id.
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fewer manual errors.”32  While high frequency trading was at first
mainly used in the equity markets, data from the Congressional Re-
search Service shows the expansion of algorithmic trading systems in
the derivatives markets.33  The CFTC found that from October 2012
to October 2014 ATS was present on at least one side in nearly eighty
percent of foreign exchange futures trading volume, sixty-seven per-
cent of interest rate futures volume, sixty-two percent of equity fu-
tures volume, forty-seven percent of metals and energy futures
volume, and thirty-eight percent of agricultural product futures vol-
ume.  ATS has also risen to about sixty-seven percent of trading in
ten-year Treasury futures and sixty-four percent of Eurodollar futures
contracts.34  As shown by the data, ATS now plays a predominant role
in modern financial markets.
C. Spoofing
Spoofing, a type of market manipulation, is most easily defined as
“bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before
execution.”35  A “bid” is an offer to buy a specific commodity at the
stated price.36  An “offer” is defined as an “indication of willingness”
to sell the commodity at a certain price.37  The price level of the “of-
fer” is the “ask.”38  Trades are often quoted in terms of the “bid-ask
spread,” or the difference between the bidding price and the asking
price.39  When a trader’s bid price equals another trader’s offer price
for a given quantity of a given contract the trade is said to be “hit,”
which means the order goes through and the contract is “traded” from
the seller to the buyer.40
Spoofing occurs when a trader places a large bid or offer order at a
price slightly above or below what the contract is currently trading
for.41  The spoofing trader fools the market into thinking the price for
32. Id.
33. MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 24, at 1.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 7.
36. CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note 7.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. An example of spoofing occurs when one trader holds 1,000 shares of a company that is
actively trading at $10. MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 24, at 9.  The trader then places a bid to
buy 100 shares of the company at $10.01. Id.  High frequency trading algorithms automatically
respond by raising their own bids on the company’s stock to $10.01. Id.  Before any of the bids
are matched by a countering offer, the original spoofer cancels his bid and instead offers his
original 1,000 shares at the new price of $10.01. Id.  His offers are hit by high frequency trading
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the contract is rising and then takes advantage of this change in price
before other market participants can react.42  Before the proliferation
of high frequency trading this style of market manipulation would
have been nearly impossible, as other market participants would see
the spoofer had cancelled his original bids and lowered their prices
accordingly.43  However, recognizing spoofing today is increasingly
difficult because ATS allows the entire sequence to occur instantane-
ously.44  Additionally, because these trades are automated and the act
of legitimately cancelling bids or offers occurs thousands of times a
day, it can be difficult to ascertain when market activity amounts to
spoofing.45  Indeed, high frequency traders ultimately cancel about
90% of their orders.46  Therefore, there is no bright line standard reg-
ulators can apply to delineate between lawful and fraudulent trade
cancellations.
D. High Frequency Trading Regulation in Modern Markets
While laws created in the 1920s and 1930s continue to regulate fi-
nancial markets generally,47 the Dodd-Frank Act was the first regula-
tory statute to specifically mention high frequency trading.48  Before
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, market regulations and
prohibitions only dealt with trading behavior without explicit mention
of actual trading techniques.49  Passed in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act is
a product of the Great Recession50 of the late 2000s and has the gen-
eral purpose of preventing another collapse of major financial institu-
tions.51  Additionally, two sections of the Dodd-Frank Act deal
algorithms that had raised their bids to $10.01, and the spoofer makes ten more dollars than he
would have had he sold his 100 shares at the original price of $10. Id.
42. MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 24, at 7.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Simone Foxman, 96.8% of Trades Placed in the US Stock Market Are Cancelled, QUARTZ
(Oct. 9, 2013), https://qz.com/133695/96-8-of-trades-placed-in-the-us-stock-market-are-
cancelled/.
47. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C § 78a (2012); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 5301; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
49. Getting Up to Speed on High-Frequency Trading, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (Nov.
25, 2015), http://www.finra.org/investors/getting-speed-high-frequency-trading.
50. Robert Rich, The Great Recession, FED. RESERVE HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://
www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_recession_of_200709.
51. Mark Koba, Dodd-Frank Act: CNBC Explains, CNBC: CNBC EXPLAINS (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/47075854.  In addition to the addition of anti-spoofing rules to the CEA,
Dodd-Frank was also enacted, in part, to regulate systemically important financial institutions
(“SIFIs”) that are deemed “too big to fail” and are therefore integral to the economic health of
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exclusively with high frequency trading.52  The first is section 747,
which amended section 4c(a)(5) of the CEA to also cover disruptive
trading in the derivatives markets.53  The second is section 967, which
allowed the SEC to conduct a study to examine the effects high fre-
quency trading had on the market.54  Bills have also been introduced
in the Senate and House addressing high frequency trading.55  While
the bills have not been enacted, the post-recession emphasis on regu-
lating high frequency trading and the use of ATS will surely lead to
future regulations.
Prior to Dodd-Frank, the CFTC administered two rules that only
tangentially applied to spoofing.  Under section 4c(a)(2)(B) of the
CEA, it was unlawful to “offer to enter into, enter into, or confirm the
execution of a transaction” that “is used to cause any price to be re-
ported, registered, or recorded that is not a true and bona-fide
price.”56  Section 9(a)(2) prohibited “caus[ing] to be delivered for
transmission . . . false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports
concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or
tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce.”57
Under these pre-Dodd-Frank rules, the CFTC was not able to punish
spoofing directly.58  Instead, the Commission was only able to punish
traders via some of the effects of spoofing.59  However, Title VII of
the United States. Id. Under this rule, if any financial institution is deemed a SIFI, the Federal
Reserve (“the Fed”), which can impose reserve requirements that necessitate the use of a bank,
can require them to increase its cash on hand (cash not being used in bank business) that it can
use for liquidity in a time of economic crisis. Id.  The Fed can also require the banks to have a
plan in place for the effective shutdown of all bank business in the event that the bank becomes
insolvent. Id.  Another major aspect of Dodd-Frank is the Volker Rule, which prohibits banks
from owning, investing, or sponsoring any hedge funds, private equity funds, or any proprietary
trading operations for their own profit. Id.
52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§ 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012)); Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 967, 124 Stat.
1376, 1913 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012))
53. 12 U.S.C. § 5301; Dodd-Frank, at § 747, 123 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010).
54. Dodd-Frank, at § 967, 124 Stat. 1376, 1913 (2010).
55. See, e.g., Customer Protection and End-User Relief Act, H.R. 4413, 113th Cong. (2d Sess.
2014); Wall Street Trading and Speculators Tax Act, S. 410, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Wall
Street Trading and Speculators Tax Act, H.R. 880, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Protection from
Rogue Oil Traders Engaging in Computerized Trading Act, H.R. 2292, 113th Cong. (1st Sess.
2013).
56. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(2)(B) (2012).
57. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012).
58. D. Deniz Aktas, Developments in Banking and Financial Law, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 52, 91 (2013).
59. Matthew Kluchenek & Jacob L. Kahn, Deterring Disruption in the Derivatives Market: A
Review of the CFTC’s New Authority Over Disruptive Trading Practices, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
120, 130 (2013).
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the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA and provided a completely
new “regulatory framework for swaps and security-based swaps.”60
Section 747 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA to expressly
prohibit certain “disruptive trading” practices, including conduct that
violates legitimate bids or offers and willful and intentional spoofing.61
The updated CEA section 4c(a)(5) states that it is “unlawful for any
person to engage in any trading, practice, or conduct on or subject to
the rules of a registered entity that . . . is of the character of, or is
commonly known to the trade as, ‘spoofing.’”62
In response to the CEA amendments the CFTC issued guidance
stating that it “does not interpret reckless trading, practices, or con-
duct as constituting a ‘spoofing’ violation,” nor does it interpret the
prohibition as “reaching accidental or negligent trading, practices, or
conduct.”63  Rather, the agency must prove the trader intended to
cancel the bid before execution.64  However, the CFTC does not need
to prove that the trader intended to move the market.65  The guidance
states a violation of section 4c(a)(5)(C) does not “requir[e] a pattern
of activity”; rather, “even a single instance of trading activity” can be
a violation if it is coupled with the prohibited intent.66  To determine
whether a trader has violated the anti-spoofing statute the CFTC must
look at the individual facts and circumstances.67  This circumstantial
evidence includes the market context, the pattern of trading activity
on the day of the alleged conduct, relevant communications, and the
ATS employed by the trader and related code.68  The CFTC will also
look at the specific trading data, such as “the number of orders sub-
mitted, duration of the orders before cancellation, [and] the relation-
ship between cancelled and executed orders.”69
CFTC regulators have also expressed the need for increased scru-
tiny of other types of market manipulation involving high frequency
trading.70  One such concern surrounds “wash trades,” which are bids
60. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,943, 14,944 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 5301; see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§ 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012)).
62. Id.
63. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,896 (May 28, 2013).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 31,892.
66. Id.
67. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,891.
68. Id. at 31,896; Canellos et al., supra note 2, at 5.
69. Canellos et al., supra note 2, at 5.
70. Scott Patterson et al., Wash Trades Scrutinized, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2013, http://on
line.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639604578366491497070204.html.
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and offers created by the same market participant that result in pro-
viding unwitting participants with a false sense of increased market
activity.71  ATS can exacerbate this issue because high frequency trad-
ers can flood the market with false offers or bids to influence prices or
increase trading volumes.72  High frequency trading can also directly
affect market stability.  For example, Knight Capital Group lost over
$440 million in less than an hour when an ATS glitch accidentally
showered the market with faulty trades.73  Accordingly, a simple com-
puter problem could potentially destroy market stability and con-
sumer confidence.
E. Spoofing Litigation
The first case brought under the new anti-spoofing statute was
United States v. Coscia.74  As is common practice in spoofing schemes,
Coscia employed a computer programmer to create two sets of ATS in
order to carry out his trades in milliseconds.75  Coscia was indicted on
six counts of spoofing and six counts of commodities fraud.76  Coscia’s
main defense argued the spoofing statute in the Dodd-Frank Act was
unconstitutionally vague.77  Coscia argued the spoofing provision did
not offer an “ascertainable standard that separate[d]” illegal spoofing
from common, legal practices such as “partial-fill orders” and “stop-
loss orders.”78  A court will find a statute is impermissibly vague and
violates the Due Process Clause if it “fails to provide a person of ordi-
nary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless
that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.”79
The court examined interpretive guidance the CFTC published
while implementing the spoofing statute.80  According to the proposed
guidance, “orders, modifications, or cancellations” would not be con-
71. The CFTC defines wash trading as “entering into, or purporting to enter into, transactions
to give the appearance that purchases and sales have been made, without incurring market risk
or changing the trader’s market position.” CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note 7.
72. Patterson et al., supra note 70.
73. Nina Mehta, Knight $440 Million Loss Sealed by Rules on Canceling Trades, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/knight-440-million-loss-sealed-by-
new-rules-on-cancelingtrades.html.
74. United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653, 655 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 656.
77. Id.
78. Id. Partial-fill orders are orders that are intentionally larger than necessary and entered to
insure a sufficient quantity is obtained.  Stop-loss orders are orders that are programmed to
execute only when the market reaches a certain price. Id.
79. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 656 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
80. Id.
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sidered spoofing if “submitted as part of a legitimate, good-faith at-
tempt to consummate a trade.”81  The proposed guidance also
provided three precise examples of spoofing: “(1) submitting or can-
celling bids to overload the quotation system of a registered entity; (2)
submitting or cancelling bids or offers to delay another person’s exe-
cution of trades; and (3) submitting or cancelling multiple bids or of-
fers to create an appearance of false market depth.”82  Responding to
questions from market participants, the CFTC provided an additional
example of spoofing: submitting or cancelling bids or offers with in-
tent to create artificial price movements upwards or downwards.83
The government alleged Coscia “entered into large-volume orders
that he intended to immediately cancel before they could be filled by
other traders.”84  Because Coscia’s conduct was intended to create a
false impression regarding the number of contracts available in the
market, the court held the conduct tracked the language of the spoof-
ing statute and the CFTC’s example regarding the intent to cancel the
bid or offer before execution.85  The court held the statute’s “intent to
cancel” requirement was significant.86  Ultimately, the court reasoned
that Coscia’s “alleged ‘intent to cancel’ set[ ] his conduct apart from
[other] legitimate trading practices” and held the spoofing provision
was not unconstitutionally vague.87  Coscia was convicted of spoofing
on the CME and ICE Futures Europe exchanges, which resulted in
over $1.5 million in profits.88  Coscia was sentenced to three years in
prison, making him the first person sentenced under the Dodd-Frank
spoofing regime.89
More recently, Chicago futures trader Igor Oystacher was accused
of engaging in spoofing and market manipulation on at least fifty-one
trading days over a two-year period.90  The CFTC claimed that Oys-
tacher engaged in spoofing by placing large, passive orders91 to create
81. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,943, 14,947 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011).
82. Id.
83. Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,896 (May 28, 2013).
84. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 658.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 659.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 655.
89. Janan Hanna & Bryan Louis, First Trader Convicted of Spoofing Gets 3-Year Prison Term,
BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-13/first-trader-
convicted-of-spoofing-gets-three-year-prison-term.
90. Complaint at 1–2, CFTC v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016) (No.
1:15-cv-09196).
91. Id. at 2–3, 15.  A “passive order” is defined by the CFTC as “one that is at the same or
worse price than either the lowest existing sell order or the highest existing buy order at the time
of entry.” Id. at 8.  Passive orders are said to “rest” in the book and will only result in a trade if
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false market depth on at least five futures products.92  The CFTC mar-
ket data showed Oystacher was a massive trader in the aforemen-
tioned markets.93  The CFTC alleged Oystacher utilized a platform
with a function called “avoid orders that cross.”94  This function en-
sured that Oystacher’s orders would never match one another by si-
multaneously cancelling orders on the opposite side of the market
when new orders were placed.95  This enabled Oystacher to never hit
his own orders further perpetuating his spoofing scheme.96  Oystacher
allegedly reaped millions of dollars in profits from this spoofing
scheme.97
In October 2016, the CFTC settled its claims against Oystacher.98
Oystacher and his trading firm agreed to pay a $2.5 million civil pen-
alty and allowed the firm to be monitored by an outside third party for
three years.99  The settlement required the employment of certain
compliance tools regarding Oystacher’s futures trading on U.S. ex-
changes for eighteen months.100  The settlement also “permanently
prohibit[ed]  Oystacher and 3Red from spoofing and employ[ing] . . .
manipulative or deceptive devices while trading futures contracts, in-
an aggressive order from another trader matches with the order. Id.  An “aggressive order” is
“one that crosses the bid-ask spread at the time of entry.” Id.  “In other words, an aggressive
buy order will be priced at or above the lowest priced sell order [ ] in the book and an aggressive
order will be immediately executed, at least in part, and fully executed if enough contracts are
posted on the Order Book at that price or better, to fill the order.” Id.
92. Complaint at 2–3, CFTC v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016) (No.
1:15-cv-09196).  These products included the Commodity Exchange Inc.’s (COMEX) March
2012 copper futures contract; the New York Mercantile Exchange’s (NYMEX) spot crude oil
futures contract; the NYMEX spot month natural gas contract; the CBOE Futures Exchange’s
(CFE) March 2013 volatility index futures contract (VIX); and the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change’s (CME) spot month E-Mini S&P 500 futures contract. Id.
93. Id. at 3.  Oystacher was the largest trader “in the respective contracts for copper, natural
gas, VIX, and E-Mini S&P 500 futures, and the third largest trader in the spot-month contract
for crude oil futures . . . during these alleged spoofing periods, despite the presence of thousands
of other traders in these markets.” Id.
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id.
96. Complaint at 15, CFTC v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016) (No.
1:15-cv-09196).
97. Matthew Leising, The Man Accused of Spoofing Some of the World’s Biggest Futures Ex-
changes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-19/
before-u-s-called-igor-oystacher-a-spoofer-he-was-known-as-990.
98. Janan Hanna, CFTC Settling Suit Against 3Red’s Accused Spoofer Oystacher, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-19/cftc-reaches-settlement-
with-3red-s-accused-spoofer-oystacher.
99. Dave Michaels, Head Of 3Red Trading Settles CFTC Claims He Engaged in Spoofing,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/head-of-3red-trading-settles-cftc-
claims-he-engaged-in-spoofing-1482278089.
100. Id.
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cluding entering bids or offers with the intent to cancel before
execution.”101
Another spoofing case involved London-based trader Navinder
Sarao who allegedly manipulated the E-mini S&P 500 near month fu-
tures contracts.102  According to the CFTC, from 2009 until the com-
plaint was filed in 2015 Sarao developed and implemented an ATS to
place, modify, and cancel several hundred thousand orders with no
intention of executing them.103  This period of trading included May 6,
2010, when the prices of the E-mini S&P and the general equities mar-
kets quickly crashed and regained their previous levels within a matter
of minutes.104  Almost $1 trillion in market value was briefly lost dur-
ing the crash.105
Sarao utilized two different spoofing techniques to manipulate the
market: the “Layering Algorithm” and “Flash Spoofing.”106  Sarao’s
Layering Algorithm was custom designed by a computer programmer
and allowed him to rapidly place, modify, and cancel orders within the
E-mini S&P market.107  Sarao used the Algorithm to place four to six
massive sell orders into the E-mini S&P Order Book, “each one tick
from the next, generally beginning at least three or four ticks from the
best asking price.”108  As the market moved in response to the sell
101. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Federal Court Orders Chicago
Trader Igor B. Oystacher and 3Red Trading LLC to Pay $2.5 Million Penalty for Spoofing and
Employment of a Manipulative and Deceptive Device, while Trading Futures Contracts on Mul-
tiple Futures Exchanges (Dec. 20, 2016) (available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Press-
Releases/pr7504-16).
102. Complaint at 1, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
17, 2015).
103. Id. at 1–2.
104. The “Flash Crash,” as May 6, 2010 became to be known, was at least partially caused by a
significant imbalance in the E-mini S&P 500 market:
Between 1:41 and 1:44 pm CT, the E-mini S&P market price suffered a sharp decline of
3%.  Then, at 1:45 pm CT, in a matter of 15 seconds, the E-mini S&P market price
dropped another 1.7%.  The price crash in the E-mini S&P market quickly spread to
major U.S. equities indices, which suffered precipitous declines in value of approxi-
mately 5 to 6%.
Id. at 2, 8.  Just a few minutes after the drop occurred, prices across all markets rebounded to at
or near their original price levels.  The CFTC and SEC investigated and concluded that a “signif-
icant imbalance between sell orders and buy orders contributed to a sudden loss of liquidity in
the E-mini S&P market.  This loss of liquidity, in conjunction with other market events, directly
contributed to the E-mini S&P price crash.” Id.
105. Ben Rooney, Trading Program Sparked May ‘Flash Crash’, CNN MONEY (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/01/markets/SEC_CFTC_flash_crash/.
106. Complaint at 11, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
17, 2015).
107. Id. at 12.
108. Id. at 13.  “Tick sizes dictate the minimum standards at which the price of a particular
contract can move. If a contract had a tick size of $0.50 and a current price of $20, the associated
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orders the Layering Algorithm instantaneously modified the large
sell-side order prices.109  This meant the new orders would always stay
at least three to four ticks from the best asking price on the Order
Book, ensuring they would never be hit.110  This process would occur
hundreds of times in a given trading day.111  Additionally, Sarao’s or-
der modifications on these days accounted for at least sixty percent of
all sell-side order modifications, meaning his trading pattern ac-
counted for over half of the cancelled trades on the E-mini S&P mar-
ket.112  Additionally, Sarao manually “flashed” large orders in the E-
mini S&P Order Book that were quickly cancelled with no intention
of resulting in trades.113
In November 2016, Sarao pled guilty to one count of spoofing and
one count of wire fraud in a criminal case related to the CFTC’s civil
case.114  On the same day as the guilty plea the CFTC proposed a
Consent Order that would effectively resolve its case against Sarao.115
According to the Order, Sarao would admit that he: “successfully
manipulated the E-Mini S&P on at least 12 days” including the day of
the Flash Crash, “attempted to manipulate the E-Mini S&P tens of
thousands of times” over a five year period, “placed tens of thousands
of bids and offers that he intended to cancel before execution” over a
four year period, and that he “employed or attempted to employ a
manipulative device, scheme, or artifice to defraud in connection with
his spoof orders.”116  Finally, the Consent Order sought to impose
more than $38 million in monetary sanctions, trading bans, and per-
manent prohibitions against future violations of the CEA.117  Per the
price can move to $20.50, but cannot move to $20.25.” Tick Size, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tick-size.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
109. Id.
110. Complaint at 13, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
17, 2015).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 14.
113. Id. at 17.  “Specifically, [Sarao] manually placed 1,728 sell-side orders in lot sizes of 188
and 289 with an approximate notional value of $26.5 billion.” Id.  Sarao then cancelled approxi-
mately 95% of the 188 and 289 sell orders priors to any execution.  Complaint at 17, CFTC v.
Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2015).
114. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Submits Proposed Con-
sent Order to Federal Court in Chicago That Would Resolve the CFTC’s Price Manipulation and
Spoofing Action Against U.K. Resident Navinder Singh Sarao (Nov. 9, 2016) (available at http://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7480-16).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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proposed Order the court required Sarao “to pay a $25,743,174.52
civil monetary penalty and $12,871,587.26 in disgorgement.”118
The three cases described above, while all resulting in successful
prosecutions, demonstrate the immense challenges faced by regulators
when they pursue a spoofing charge.  These are the only cases that
have been brought since the enactment of the anti-spoofing statute in
the Dodd-Frank Act.  This demonstrates that monitoring and regulat-
ing spoofing is an uphill battle for those charged with enforcing the
rules of the derivatives market.
III. ANALYSIS
This Part begins by examining how the CFTC and exchange groups
have regulated spoofing after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted.  This
Part then argues current spoofing regulations create market inefficien-
cies due to lack of enforcement, which leads to an absence of credible
information available to market participants.  Additionally, lax en-
forcement also leads to market illiquidity as traders are often forced
to stay on the sidelines because the spoofed prices do not reflect ac-
tual market conditions or the trader does not want to cancel trades for
fear of running afoul of the anti-spoofing laws.  Finally, this Part con-
tends that by decentralizing the regulatory scheme and increasing the
spoofing penalties available to the CFTC and market exchanges,
spoofing can be properly controlled and markets can return to their
efficient, liquid state.
A. Private Companies Take On Spoofing Enforcement
While the CFTC has secured enforcement actions under the Dodd-
Frank Act, the spoofing statute is still ill-equipped to deal with mod-
ern high frequency trading systems.  Because no one knows how wide-
spread spoofing really is119 the CFTC’s three successful spoofing cases
are likely a drop in the bucket.120  Additionally, buying and selling in
derivatives markets and equities markets is functionally different.
Bids and asks can go back and forth for some time before settling on a
118. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Federal Court in Chicago Or-
ders U.K. Resident Navinder Singh Sarao to Pay More Than $38 Million in Monetary Sanctions
for Price Manipulation and Spoofing, (Nov. 17, 2016) (available at http://www.cftc.gov/Press
Room/PressReleases/pr7486-16).
119. Matthew Leising, Spoofing Went Mainstream In 2015, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/nabbing-the-rogue-algo-inside-the-year-
spoofing-went-mainstream.
120. Andrew Harris & Matthew Leising, Market Manipulation Complaints are Common but
Prosecutions Rare, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
04-23/market-manipulation-complaints-are-common-but-prosecutions-rare.
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price, leading to contract prices that often move quickly and unpre-
dictably.121  Further, far more orders per day are legitimately can-
celled than are ultimately filled, forcing regulators to sift through
millions of cancelled trades per day to deduce whether spoofing has
occurred.122  This shows why it is nearly impossible to prove spoofing.
Spoofing is hard to detect, therefore proper regulation and enforce-
ment are critical to maintaining competitive markets.123  In fact, in-
creased CFTC enforcement after the Dodd-Frank Act likely boosts
confidence in the market along with overall market participation.
Thus, parties who previously left a certain contract market would be
more likely to re-enter if manipulation is no longer occurring.124
However, the CFTC does not have access to real time market data,
leaving it largely reliant on exchanges and market participants to open
cases or file complaints.125  Thus exchanges, because they have access
to that information, are currently in the best position to detect spoof-
ing, take action, and report the suspect activity to the CFTC.
Indeed, the CFTC recently stated CME Group126 needs to do more
to identify spoofing and quickly bring enforcement actions.127  In re-
sponse to the CFTC’s statements CME Group released a market reg-
ulation advisory notice in August 2014.128  The notice incorporated
section 747 of Dodd-Frank into the new CME Rule 575, prohibiting
certain disruptive practices including spoofing.129  The new CME
121. Gregory Meyer et al., Regulators Step Up Efforts to Stop Spoofing, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2015, https://www.ft.com/content/f0aa13bc-839d-11e5-8e80-1574112844fd.
122. MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 24, at 7.
123. Elise Fleischaker, How Spoofing Works & Why It Is Illegal, NEURENSIC (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://neurensic.com/spoofing-works-illegal/.
124. How These Chicago Firms Took on Spoofing, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Dec. 28, 2015, http://
www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20151228/NEWS01/151229912/how-these-chicago-firms-took-
on-spoofing.  One large trading firm reported losses of $60,000 per day during a period when
spoofing was particularly bad, and Citadel, one of the world’s largest alternative assets manag-
ers, said the lost business from pulling back from trades involving spoofing cost the firm millions
of dollars. Id.
125. Roy Strom, To Catch a Spoofer, CHI. LAWYER, Apr. 1, 2016, http://www.chicagolawyer
magazine.com/Archives/2016/04/spoofing-April16.aspx.
126. The CME Group is a financial market company operating the world’s largest options and
futures exchange. See CME Group Overview, CME GROUP (2016), at 1–2, http://
www.cmegroup.com/company/history/.
127. Bradley Hope, As ‘Spoof’ Trading Persists, Regulators Clamp Down, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-spoofing-traders-dupe-markets-1424662202; Matthew
Leising, Spoofing, BLOOMBERG: QUICKTAKE (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/
quicktake/spoofing.
128. Market Regulation Advisory Notice, CME GROUP (Aug. 29, 2014), http://
www.cmegroup.com/tools-information/lookups/advisories/market-regulation/files/RA1405-5.pdf.
129. Id.; CME Rule 575 Subparagraph 5 provides in part:
(5) DISRUPTIVE PRACTICES – It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any
trading, practice, or conduct on or subject to the rules of a registered entity that –
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Group rule requires proof of intent, a key component of CFTC en-
forcement, and states it may be found outside of situations where par-
ticipants explicitly state their intent.130  For the CME Group to prove
intent it must show it was more likely than not the actions were in-
tended to produce a prohibited disruptive consequence.131  In con-
trast, the CFTC must prove that the trader intended to create an
“artificial price.”132  The difference between these two standards frus-
trates the ability of the two entities to work together to police spoof-
ing, as the CME Group’s standard for intent is easier to prove in
comparison to the CFTC’s standard for intent.133
From a modern market perspective, the current detection methods
are arguably inadequate considering the prevalence of high frequency
trading and the vast number of trades that occur each day.  Before
digital trading, face-to-face interactions made it easier to detect spoof-
ing.134  However, trades are now commonly conducted by ATS so the
layer of security that came from human interaction is lost.  To combat
this issue companies have devised ways to efficiently sift through mar-
ket data to spot suspicious trading activity and alert regulators.  Ver-
tex Analytics, a Chicago-based analytics firm, can graph every order
and transaction on CME Group’s markets.135  Vertex bills itself as a
superior compliance tool capable of easily spotting spoofing patterns
in the futures market.136  With Vertex’s software, compliance officials
(A) violates bids or offers;
(B) demonstrates intentional or reckless disregard for the orderly execution of transac-
tions during the closing period; or
(C) is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, “spoofing” (bidding
or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution).
Id.
130. Nicole M. Kuchera & Joseph M. Mannon, New CME Rule 575 on Disruptive Trading
Practices – Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade, New York Mercantile Ex-
change, and Commodity Exchange, Inc., NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.natlawre
view.com/article/new-cme-rule-575-disruptive-trading-practices-chicago-mercantile-exchange-
chicago-bo.
131. Id.
132. Paul M. Architzel et al., The Manipulation Standard and a Setback for CFTC, LAW360,
(Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/853970/the-manipulation-standard-and-a-set
back-for-cftc.
133. Id.  The CFTC is the federal regulator charged with overseeing the derivatives markets.
The CFTC often relies on the exchanges to monitor market activities and to enforce the ex-
changes’ own rules. U.S. Futures Regulator in Spotlight After Latest Scandal, REUTERS (July 10,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/cftc-pfg/u-s-futures-regulator-in-spotlight-after-latest-scan
dal-idUSL2E8IAELI20120711.
134. Leising, supra note 119.
135. Id.  For more information on Vertex Analytics, see generally VERTEX ANALYTICS, http://
www.vertex-analytics.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
136. Compliance Officers: Mitigate Your Failure to Supervise, VERTEX, http://www.vertex-ana
lytics.com/compliance (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
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no longer have to manually review documents to identify specific in-
stances of spoofing.137
Another Chicago-based technology consulting firm, Neurensic, Inc.,
develops market surveillance software to help firms identify spoof-
ing.138  Neurensic employs artificial intelligence software to analyze
the trading data of firms and exchanges to identify “clusters” of data
that may signal spoofing.139  Neurensic’s machine-learning software
can effectively teach itself, incorporating years of data obtained from
exchanges, trading firms, and regulators to better identify suspicious
activity within the market.140  However, even with Neurensic’s ad-
vanced software, CEO David Widerhorn still believes spoofing is
more prevalent than many traders and regulators believe, noting his
customer base is growing “rapidly” in response to high frequency
spoofers.141
While companies such as Vertex and Neurensic have created
software to detect spoofing patterns, enforcement remains an issue.
Firms want to detect spoofing in order to avoid losses, such as when
Citadel lost millions by pulling out of trades in a market with an active
spoofer.142  Exchanges want to detect spoofing to protect market par-
ticipants and comply with CFTC mandates.143  While trading firms
may be willing to report suspicious activity to regulators they find with
compliance software, the main goal of any trading firm is to be profit-
able.144  New tools to identify spoofing are rapidly entering the mar-
ket, but trading firms primarily employ this software for their own
financial protection.145  Because profit, not enforcement, is the prior-
ity at these firms, it is unlikely they will act to curb this behavior.
137. Leising, supra note 119.
138. Lucy Ren, High Profile ‘Spoofing’ Case Put Traders on Edge, MEDILL (May 22, 2015),
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/high-profile-spoofing-cases-put-traders-on-edge/.
Neurensic, Inc. is formerly known as David Widerhorn Consulting. For more information on
Neurensic, Inc., see generally NEURENSIC, http://www.neurensic.com (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
139. Id.
140. Lynne Marek, Inside One Chicago Startup’s Plan to Target Spoofers, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS.,
Dec. 9, 2015, http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20151209/NEWS01/151209759/inside-one-
chicago-startups-plan-to-target-spoofers.
141. Ren, supra note 138.
142. Leising, supra note 119.
143. Bloomberg Markets, CME’s Duffy: We Don’t Allow Spoofing on Our Exchange, BLOOM-
BERG (June 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2016-06-09/cme-s-duffy-we-don-t-
allow-spoofing-on-our-exchange.
144. Steve Denning, Is The Goal of a Corporation to Make Money?, FORBES (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/09/26/is-the-goal-of-a-corporation-to-make-
money/#6fa98d537658.
145. Ren, supra note 138.
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Thus, traders are inadequately deterred from spoofing because of its
pervasiveness in the market and the CFTC’s lack of enforcement.
Accordingly, the anti-spoofing statute is an ineffective tool for mon-
itoring and prosecuting spoofing because federal regulators are forced
to rely on profit-seeking corporations.  Unfortunately for proponents
of increased regulation, the CFTC lacks the ability to effectively track
daily market activity.146  Currently, innovative tools that identify
spoofing are used mostly by trading firms to ensure they do not lose
money in a manipulated market.147  With millions of orders and bids
placed and cancelled daily, current CFTC enforcement techniques are
ineffective at identifying sophisticated spoofers.  The exchanges are
better positioned to regulate spoofing because of their proximity to
the derivatives market and access to resources.
B. Spoofing Regulation Creates Market Inefficiencies
What makes spoofing identification difficult is the fact that traders
utilizing ATS in liquid markets often legitimately cancel far more
trades per day than they execute.148  The “intent to cancel” require-
ment is nearly impossible to prove because it is difficult to decipher
whether or not cancelled trades were intended to manipulate the mar-
ket.149  Conversely, traders must comply with CFTC regulations when
cancelling orders, which has led traders to shift trading tactics in order
to remain compliant and profitable.  Some traders have been forced to
shift to contracts with longer time horizons, focusing on analysis
rather than speed.150  However, forced trading shifts often lead to
market inefficiencies.151
An efficient market is based on the assumption that prices within
the market reflect all available and relevant information.152  However,
spoofing combined with the aforementioned forced trading shifts indi-
cate the derivatives market prices do not reflect all available and rele-
vant information.  When one spoofer places a large number of
fraudulent offers or bids it creates an order imbalance and ATS  often
146. Mark Melin, CFTC Does Not Have Regular Access to Flash Crash “Spoofing” Data,
VALUEWALK (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/04/cftc-flash-crash/.
147. VERTEX, supra note 135.
148. MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 24, at 7.
149. United States v. Coscia, 100 F.Supp.3d 653, 659 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
150. Ren, supra note 139.  Time horizons are defined as “the length of time over which an
investment is made or held before it is liquidated.” Time Horizon, INVESTOPEDIA, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/t/timehorizon.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
151. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
152. Market Efficiency, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketeffi
ciency.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
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automatically responds by piggybacking upon those bids or offers,
which results in an even larger imbalance.153  This cyclical process oc-
curs in a matter of seconds and creates a lack of reliable information
on which traders, or their trading algorithms, can act.154  Given the
prevalence of spoofing, the derivatives markets often suffer from a
lack of information and are therefore inefficient at times.155
If traders are constantly worried about governmental action they
will likely alter trading algorithms to slow down trade times or cancel
fewer trades.  As it is unlikely that traders will exit the market alto-
gether, this will have the effect of forcing traders to execute trades
they would have otherwise cancelled, damaging profits and diminish-
ing efficiency.156  Dennis Dick, a proprietary trader and head of mar-
kets structure at Bright Trading claimed “[t]here is always a risk that
[regulators] might prosecute someone innocent, especially those trad-
ers that change their mind frequently.”157  The increase in analytical
tools that spot spoofing makes it possible that, should regulators em-
ploy these tools in the future, traders or firms simply responding to a
change in market conditions could be identified as spoofers.  While
the CTFC must still prove intent, risk averse traders would likely
change their behavior to avoid this situation altogether, leading to fur-
ther inefficiencies.
Market illiquidity can also exacerbate market inefficiency.158  When
a spoofer places offers or bids never intended for execution, the bid-
ask spread of the contract never narrows to the point at which the bid
or offer is hit.159  The spoofing artificially alters the price of a given
contract, leading to illiquidity because some traders may not be willing
to buy or sell at the new, fraudulent price.160  This illiquidity arguably
slows down the market because traders must either take a step back to
wait for the contract price to return to its original position or decide
whether they want to enter the market at the new, manipulated price.
The lack of an accurate price illustrates how spoofing causes illiquidity
and furthers market inefficiency.
153. Rooney, supra note 105.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Ren, supra note 138.
158. Market liquidity refers to “the degree to which an asset or security can be quickly bought
or sold in the market without affecting the asset’s price.” Market Liquidity, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).  In the derivatives
market, when the bid-ask spread is relatively narrow, the market is more liquid. Id.  However, a
larger bid-ask spread can lead to illiquidity. Id.
159. CFTC GLOSSARY, supra note 7.
160. Montgomery, supra note 10.
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C. A New Way Forward
To address enforcement difficulties in spoofing, section 747 of the
Dodd-Frank Act should be amended to decentralize the CFTC’s en-
forcement power.  The exchanges and market participants closer to
the problem could better wield this enforcement power.  Next, the
CEA should be amended to provide harsher penalties for traders con-
victed of spoofing.  Only once spoofing can be effectively monitored
and enforced with significant penalties and incarceration can govern-
ment regulators begin to remedy the dangerous manipulation of the
derivatives markets.
1. Decentralizing the Regulatory Scheme
Currently, both the CFTC and exchanges can enforce monetary
penalties on traders that have spoofed the market.161  However, only
the exchanges and market participants have access to real-time mar-
ket data crucial to identifying market manipulation without undue de-
lay.162  Additionally, unlike the CFTC, these exchanges have the
financial capability to better monitor the markets daily.  While the
CFTC has not grown in size in the past twenty years, the size of the
derivatives markets during the same period has increased by over
500%.163  The CFTC’s size and perpetual underfunding has led to se-
lective enforcement—the CFTC only prosecutes the largest and most
egregious spoofing cases.164
In response to CFTC requests, CME Group has hired more investi-
gators and increased funding to detect spoofing.165  More power
should be ceded to the exchanges for enforcement to have real im-
pact.  Exchanges already have the best access to market data and bet-
ter access to new software, which would allow for automated
enforcement.166  Additionally, better analytic tools could help to pre-
vent false identification, leading to market efficiency and liquidity.  If
traders knew rules and regulations were being properly enforced, con-
161. Anne M. Termine et al., CME Implements Significant Penalty Increases for Futures and
Swaps Trading Violations, COVINGTON (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.covfinancialservices.com/
2016/12/cme-implements-significant-penalty-increases-for-futures-and-swaps-trading-violations/.
162. Strom, supra note 125.
163. Kobi Kastiel, The Changing Landscape of the CFTC’s Enforcement Actions, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 4, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2013/05/04/the-changing-landscape-of-the-cftcs-enforcement-actions/.
164. Id.
165. Sarah N. Lynch, CFTC Says CME Directed to Beef Up ‘Spoofing’ Enforcement, REUTERS
(May 14, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cftc-cme-group-spoofing-idUSKBN0NZ1LW
20150514.
166. CME GROUP, supra note 126.
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cerns over whether legitimately cancelled trades could be mistaken for
spoofing would diminish.167
Decentralizing the regulatory scheme away from the CFTC and to-
wards the exchanges also allows for better prosecution of spoofing.
Exchanges are in the best position to prosecute spoofers who make
little profit or run their spoofing algorithm a limited number of times.
For example, CME Group recently fined and permanently barred two
such traders for spoofing the gold and silver futures market.168  Gen-
erally, exchanges have the ability to effectively deter all spoofing of-
fenses and ensure spoofers are not able to manipulate derivatives
markets.169
Even though the exchanges would have this oversight, the CFTC
would maintain control over egregious spoofing offenses and be able
to better use its limited resources.  The exchanges, or other market
participants, would still funnel egregious spoofing conduct, like the
spoofing in the Oystacher and Sarao cases, to the CFTC.  The CFTC
could then better utilize its limited budget because it would only pros-
ecute the most serious spoofing.  In fact, this is how the CFTC cur-
rently operates, flagging only the largest examples of spoofing because
it does not receive alerts of less serious conduct or have the resources
to identify and prosecute them.170
Finally, decentralization will prove regulators are serious about pro-
tecting market participants.  Until 2010, trading laws did not even ex-
plicitly ban the practice of spoofing.171  Currently, most traders are
probably aware that the vast majority of spoofing violations go unde-
tected.172  If a new regulatory scheme allowed all spoofers to be prose-
cuted potential spoofers might be deterred from engaging in market
manipulation.  This could lead traders to conclude the likelihood of
detection and prosecution far outweighs the benefits of spoofing, de-
terring the undesired activity.
167. Ren, supra note 138.
168. Tom Polansek, CME Group Fines, Bars Two UAE Futures Traders Over ‘Spoofing,’
REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cme-group-spoofing-metals-id
USKCN0XP2TE.
169. Tom Polansek, CME Group Urgently Suspends Trader for Spoofing, REUTERS (Aug. 22,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cme-group-trader-spoofing-idUSKCN10Y01Z.
170. Kastiel, supra note 163.
171. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
172. Suzanne Barlyn, U.S. Regulator Says ‘Flash Crash’ Manipulation Hard to Detect,
REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/flashcrash-trader-finra-ketchum-id
USL1N0XL28W20150424.
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2. Increasing Penalties to Reflect Harm Done to the Market
Current penalties for spoofing are inadequate to properly deter this
type of market manipulation.  Under CFTC regulations, the maximum
penalty is triple the monetary gain from each violation or $140,000,
whichever is greater.173  If the Department of Justice decides to bring
criminal charges, as they did in the Sarao case, a convicted defendant
can face up to one million dollars in fines and ten years in prison per
count.174  Additionally, the CME Group recently proposed an in-
crease to its maximum fines from $1 million to $5 million to further
deter spoofing.175
Calculating the correct punishment for spoofers involves consider-
ing who, or what, is actually harmed by the manipulative conduct.
Some experts argue that spoofing actually creates market efficiency
because spoofing programs typically only run for seconds at a time.176
According to this belief, the only market participants harmed by
spoofing are high frequency trading “front runners,”177 not individual
investors.  This is because individual investors do not react to the mar-
ket in milliseconds or microseconds; only ATS employed by large, in-
stitutional investors can react.178  In effect, front running can be
173. A person who is found liable for spoofing in an administrative proceeding can be barred
from trading on an exchange, have his CFTC registration suspended or revoked, and be forced
to pay a penalty and restitution.  The penalty may not exceed the greater of $140,000 or triple
the monetary gain to the person for each violation.  A violator may also be ordered to cease and
desist. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(4), 9(10), 13b (2012).  A person found liable for spoofing in federal
district court can be subject to an injunction, and forced to pay disgorgement, restitution, and a
penalty.  The penalty may not exceed the greater of $140,000 or triple the monetary gain to the
person for each violation. See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 143.8 (2012) (adjusting statu-
tory penalty amount for inflation).
174. Indictment at 1, United States v. Sarao, No. 15-cr-00075 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2015).  The
DOJ can bring criminal charges against a defendant who “knowingly” violates Section
4c(a)(5)(C). See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012).  If criminally convicted of spoofing, a defendant can
face up to $1 million in fines and 10 years in prison per count. Id.
175. Tom Polansek, Rule Breakers Face Bigger Possible Fines From CME Group, REUTERS
(Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cme-group-crime-fines-idUSKBN13Q5ZB.
176. John D. Arnold, Spoofers Keep Markets Honest, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Jan. 23, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-01-23/high-frequency-trading-spoofers-and-front-
running.
177. “Front running” is the unethical and illegal practice by which a trader obtains profits by
stepping in front of orders placed or about to be placed by others to gain a price advantage.  For
example, a broker may receive a client order to purchase 100,000 shares of a given company.
Such a large purchase will surely drive the price of the company’s stock up.  Before the broker
places the client order, he “front runs” the order by placing a small order for the same company
in a personal account at the original, lower price.  Once the broker subsequently places the large
client order, he takes advantage of the price jump by selling at the higher price. See Front
Running, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/frontrunning.asp (last visited
Dec. 29, 2016); Arnold, supra note 176.
178. Arnold, supra note 176.
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eliminated by spoofing because when a front running high frequency
trader moves in front of a spoofer’s “order,” “the front runner is
fooled and loses money.”179  However, some argue a spoofed order
book becomes inefficient and uninformative because it no longer re-
flects accurate market information.180  While an uninformative order
book may benefit institutional investors who may want to disguise
large orders, it also harms retail investors, high frequency traders, and
index funds who need order books to reflect “maximally and instanta-
neously efficient” prices.181  The central question is who to protect
when enforcing, or not enforcing, spoofing laws.
Even though high frequency trading is the prominent way deriva-
tives are traded, spoofing laws need to favor retail investors and index
funds over front running high frequency traders.  The argument that
illegal spoofing is desirable because it cancels out illegal front running
is unpersuasive.  Allowing high frequency traders to police the market
by employing illegal trading tactics will encourage traders to utilize
illegal, manipulative practices leading to greater market inefficiency.
This policy could make it difficult for regular investors to enter the
market, as it is unlikely these investors have the financial capability or
expertise to compete with the high frequency traders.  This fact could
potentially lead to a market solely consisting of high frequency trad-
ing.  Accordingly, retail investors and the index funds must be pro-
tected to ensure their access to the market.  To this end, penalties
must be imposed that adequately deter future spoofing violations.
While many argue sufficient penalties have been imposed by point-
ing to the massive fine levied against Sarao or the three-year jail sen-
tence for Coscia, these cases are outliers.182  Moving forward,
exchanges in the proposed role of primary regulator must impose
fines on spoofers that exceed $1 million.  Even if these fines turn out
to be punitive or merely symbolic, they will deter future spoofing.
The CEA should also be amended to fine and incarcerate spoofers
commensurate with the actual harm they inflict on markets.  As de-
scribed above, spoofing can cause massive market inefficiencies and
illiquidity in the derivatives markets.  Without proper punishment,
these harms will continue to perpetuate economic harm and market
inefficiency.
179. Id.
180. Matt Levine, Why Is Spoofing Bad?, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Apr. 22, 2015), https://
www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-04-22/why-is-spoofing-bad-.
181. Id.
182. Id.; Hanna & Louis, supra note 89; Ren, supra note 138.
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IV. IMPACT
This Part begins by analyzing the negative consequences of main-
taining the status quo.  This Part then explains the benefits of decen-
tralizing the spoofing regulatory scheme and increasing punishment
for convicted spoofers.
A. The Danger of Maintaining the Status Quo
When the CFTC gained increased regulatory authority through the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, spoofing was one of the first issues
the Commission chose to address.183  The CFTC quickly indicted Cos-
cia on spoofing charges in 2014.184  In the first federal prosecution re-
garding spoofing, Coscia was convicted and sentenced to three years
in prison.185  If market participants and legal experts expected numer-
ous spoofing cases to follow, they were sorely disappointed.  Since, the
CFTC and Department of Justice have only brought two major cases
against alleged spoofers: Oystacher and Sarao.186  Oystacher ulti-
mately settled the claims, paying a $2.5 million civil monetary penalty
and agreeing to have his trading monitored by an independent third
party for three years.187  Sarao pled guilty to the criminal charges and
entered into a Consent Order with the CFTC, which required him to
pay a $25,743,174.52 civil monetary penalty and $12,871,587.26 in
disgorgement.188
It is evident from the lack of spoofing charges brought by the CFTC
that it is ill-equipped to handle modern, high frequency spoofing.  The
lack of real time market data, the small size and budget of the CFTC,
and the increased sophistication of traders practically ensure the Com-
mission prosecutes only the most blatant spoofing.189  Additionally,
183. Steve Quinlivan, CFTC’s Final Rule on Disruptive Trading Clarifies Disruptive Trading
Practices, Including That “Strobing” is Prohibited “Spoofing,” DODD-FRANK.COM (May 24,
2013), http://dodd-frank.com/cftc-disruptive-trading-practices-strobing-and-spoofing/.
184. United States v. Coscia, 100 F. Supp. 3d 653 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
185. Hanna & Louis, supra note 89.
186. Complaint at 1, CFTC v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016) (No. 15-
CV-9196); Complaint at 1, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
17, 2015).
187. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Federal Court Orders Chicago
Trader Igor B. Oystacher and 3Red Trading LLC to Pay $2.5 Million Penalty for Spoofing and
Employment of a Manipulative and Deceptive Device, while Trading Futures Contracts on Mul-
tiple Futures Exchanges (Dec. 20, 2016) (available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Press-
Releases/pr7504-16).
188. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Submits Proposed Con-
sent Order to Federal Court in Chicago That Would Resolve the CFTC’s Price Manipulation and
Spoofing Action Against U.K. Resident Navinder Singh Sarao (Nov. 9, 2016) (available at http://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7480-16).
189. Strom, supra note 125.
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the statute contained within the Dodd-Frank Act makes it difficult for
the Commission to prosecute spoofing because of the difficulties in
proving intent.190
The spoofing regulation status quo will be a continued drag on the
market.  First, the inability of the CFTC to secure regular, meaningful
prosecutions will lead to major market inefficiencies.  Efficient mar-
kets rely upon complete and accurate information.  Therefore, unen-
forced spoofing regulations create inefficiencies because available
information does not reflect the realities of the market.191  In addition,
many traders are now forced to slow down the pace of their trades or
execute trades they otherwise would have cancelled to ensure they do
not run afoul of the anti-spoofing statute.192  This, when combined
with the fact that these traders lack complete information, makes it
obvious that major inefficiencies are occurring within the derivatives
market.  Finally, the lack of enforcement also leads to illiquidity in the
market.193  Spoofing creates a fraudulent price for a given contract,
and also ensures the bid-ask spread never narrows to the point where
a spoofer’s bid or offer is hit.194  This affects other traders because
they must decide whether to wait for the price to return to its original
level, or enter the market at the new, sham price.195  Should these
traders refuse to enter the manipulated market, there will be less bids
and offers, ultimately leading to the execution of fewer trades.  There-
fore, finding a counterparty becomes increasingly difficult, cash exits
the market, and market participants are forced to sell at a substantial
loss.196
When viewed at a macroeconomic level it becomes clear that spoof-
ing leads to major market inefficiencies.  If the regulatory status quo is
maintained, these problems will only worsen, leading to a derivatives
market where no participant feels comfortable that the price for a
given contract is accurate.
190. MILLER & SHORTER, supra note 24, at 7.
191. Market Efficiency, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketeffi-
ciency.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2016).
192. Ren, supra note 138.
193. Market Liquidity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity.asp (last
visited Dec. 28, 2016).
194. Rooney, supra note 105.
195. Montgomery, supra note 10.
196. Thijs Markwat et al., The Ins and Outs of Investing in Illiquid Assets, ROBECO (July
2015), at 3–4, https://www.robeco.com/media/8/a/5/8a530cd272408d86a2c552fd04909629_201509
22-the-ins-and-outs-of-investing-in-illiquid-assets_tcm17-1887.pdf.
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B. The Beneficial Impact of Regulatory Decentralization
Though the current regulatory scheme has failed to protect market
participants, the derivatives market is not doomed to be full of fraudu-
lent traders illegally creating fraudulent prices.  The enforcement
mechanisms necessary to properly identify and prosecute spoofers are
already in place, but the appropriate authorities do not have the
power to use these mechanisms.
Exchanges are currently in the best position to properly monitor the
markets to ensure no manipulation is occurring.  Exchanges have ac-
cess to real-time market data the CFTC cannot currently obtain.197  In
addition, exchanges can implement cutting edge analytics software,
such as the software programs created by Neurensic and Vertex.198
These programs would allow the exchanges to largely automate en-
forcement.  Exchanges can enforce their own trading regulations and
have monetary penalties in place to properly deter spoofers.  Accord-
ingly, decentralizing the regulatory scheme is the best possible way to
prevent spoofing.
The CFTC would also benefit from decentralization because it
could focus its limited resources on the most egregious spoofing cases.
Spoofing cases involving low gains could be handled by the exchanges,
while major cases could be handled by the CFTC.199  Additionally,
this increased enforcement will also lead to enhanced market effi-
ciency and liquidity, leading to a derivatives market in which partici-
pants know the information they are trading on is accurate.  Informed
investors trading in an efficient and liquid market is beneficial because
efficiency results in proper asset valuations and deters asset bub-
bles.200  Without efficiency, assets can become overvalued and lead to
situations such as the dot-com bubble or housing market bubble.201
As seen when those bubbles burst, financial institutions can fail, asset
prices can slump, and investors can lose money.  Accordingly, appro-
priate steps, such as decentralizing spoofing regulation, must be taken.
197. See CME Group Overview, CME GROUP (2016), at 1–2, http://www.cmegroup.com/com-
pany/history/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2016).
198. VERTEX, supra note 136; NEURENSIC, supra note 139.
199. Complaint at 2, 8, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
17, 2015).
200. What is an Efficient Market and How Does it Affect Individual Investors?, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/marketefficiency.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2017).
201. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The anti-spoofing statute in Dodd-Frank is not an effective tool for
monitoring and prosecuting high frequency traders in modern deriva-
tives markets.  Not only does the statute fail to provide the necessary
tools to detect spoofing, but it also directly leads to inefficiency and
illiquidity within the derivatives markets.  Derivatives traders are
often forced to enter into contracts while relying on incomplete or
misleading information; some even step out of the market due to
manipulated contract prices.  However, there is a solution to these
complex problems.  The CFTC should decentralize its enforcement
scheme, giving more power to the exchanges to properly detect and
enforce spoofing occurrences.  Given the exchanges’ vastly superior
access to market data and financial resources, exchanges are in the
best position to police the markets and deter spoofers.  Changing the
way spoofing regulations are enforced will increase liquidity, market
efficiency, and competition in the derivatives markets.
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